


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HISTORY OF SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE IN FRANCE EXAMINED

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 82 pp 32-52

[Article by Eduard Aresn'yevich Drozdov, candidate of historical sciences, a specialist on the problems of the international working-class movement and the recent history of France, the author of a number of publications on these subjects: "The Alliance of Leftist Forces in France, and the Significance of the Experience With This Alliance"]

[Text] One of the most important, complex and exceptionally timely problems of the international working-class movement is the formation and operation of class and political alliances by the working class and its militant vanguard, the communist party, with the other democratic forces. Under the present conditions when the policies of imperialism are in ever-greater contradiction with the vital interests of the widest popular masses, in the capitalist countries the objective conditions are emerging for creating around the working class broad alliances in the struggle for the workers' interests, for peace and social progress.

The communists have always been and will remain the most consistent and determined advocates of uniting the working-class and democratic movements. For them the policy of ensuring the unity of action of all working-class and democratic forces is a strategic long-range policy that stems from the fundamental ideas of Marxism and Leninism regarding the proletariat's worldwide historical role. They have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to act jointly, and to cooperate as equals, with all the democratic and peace-loving forces, including the social democrats.

As General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "present-day social democracy carries considerable weight. It could do more to protect the vital interests of nations and especially to strengthen peace, improve the international situation, combat fascism and racism, and oppose the reactionary attack against the workers' political rights. In practice, however, the leaders of social democracy are by no means always acting in this direction.

"Many of them are infected with the virus of anticommunism. Some of them are allowing themselves to be led into the campaign that imperialism has organized against the socialist countries; with reference to so-called Atlantic solidarity, they are justifying the arms race . . . We definitely condemn it.

"However, we will actively support all steps that enhance the cause of peace and democracy."

The historical experience of the international working-class movement shows that the struggle to unite the working-class and democratic forces is exceptionally sharp and of a contradictory nature, requiring of communists a skillful combination of working-class adherence to principles and political flexibility, the ability to compromise but at the same time to preserve their ideological, political and organizational independence, to strengthen the formed alliance on a class basis and to lead the ideological and political struggle within this alliance, without hiding their principled standpoints and without dissolving in the broad antimonopolistic union.

The 1970's in France were filled with sharp class struggle over fundamental problems of economic and social development that affected the vital interests of wide working masses. During those years the French working-class movement gained extensive political experience that is interesting and edifying in all its dialectic contradictions, with its strong points and weaknesses, its successes and failures. We have in mind the live and specific experience of the struggle to unite and unify the working-class movement, to form a broad coalition of working-class and democratic forces on an antimonopolistic basis, i.e., an alliance of leftist forces with a joint government program (1972-1978).

The violent events of May and June 1968, which were the greatest class conflict in postwar France, and the further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism made it even more necessary and timely to present a democratic alternative to the existing regime and to demand a specific answer to the question of what political perspective the working class and its vanguard were offering in the present stage. Attention focused on many questions of theory and strategy, concerning especially the paths of transition from capitalism to socialism under the conditions in France, the nature of political power in the period of transition, and the role of the Communist Party in the struggle for the unity of the working-class movement.

Relying on their own experience and also on the experience of the international working-class movement, the French Communists set in motion the elaboration of these important problems, and also the search for the most effective ways and means in waging the struggle for the interests of the working class and other working strata.

An important result of these efforts was particularly the manifesto "For an Advanced Democracy, for a Socialist France" that the plenum of the French Communist Party Central Committee adopted in Champigny, in December 1968, which presented the party's position on the questions of strategy and tactics, in a working-class and internationalist spirit.² One of the basic conclusions that the French workers had drawn from the events of 1968 was that success of the struggle against monopolies necessitated a strong class alliance of the working-class and democratic forces based on a clear political program of antimonopolistic content.

The formation of such an alliance in which the working class would play the leading role--a necessary condition for the success of the workers' struggle--became a task of primary importance, more so than ever before.

Struggle for the masses was a task to which the Communists have always attributed exceptional importance. The formation of an alliance of the leftist forces was made to serve this objective.

Not an End in Itself But an Instrument of Struggle

A political agreement between the French Communist Party (PCF) and the French Socialist Party (PS) on a joint government program, which became the political platform of the alliance of leftist forces, was concluded by the leaders of the two parties on 28 June 1972. Shortly thereafter, the Left Radicals also joined. The agreement concerning the adoption of the program was signed by the following: G. Marchais, general secretary of the PCF; F. Mitterrand, first secretary of the PS; and R. Fabre, chairman of the Left Radical Movement.

Formation of the alliance of leftist forces on the basis of a joint government program became an important factor that had a profound effect on the entire political life of France. For the first time in the postwar period, the principal political parties of the Left had agreed not only on joint struggle to achieve power, but also on a joint action program for the time when the leftist forces would come to power, on the basic directions of the democratic government's policies. Thus the alliance was not a tactical agreement before elections, but a political agreement of a long-term nature.

In a single article within this journal it is not possible to present the complete history of the alliance of leftist forces and the complex and occasionally truly dramatic circumstances under which the struggle for the formation of the alliance unfolded, nor to fully describe the activity of the alliance. We merely wish to note that the Communist Party made the decisive contribution toward the formation of the alliance and was its main motive force throughout every stage of the alliance. The PCF regarded this alliance not as an end in itself, but as an instrument of the struggle for the workers' interests, for democracy and socialism, as the axis of a broad union of all working-class and democratic forces.

Actually the policy to ensure the unity of the working class, to form and strengthen an alliance of the leftist forces on a class basis, has been pursued by the PCF throughout its entire history. In accordance with Lenin's ideas regarding a unified working-class front, the French Communists have waged and are waging a constant struggle for the unity and solidarity of the working-class movement, and along this path they have repeatedly scored real results. This was the case during the years of the National Front, and again in the period of the struggle for the liberation of France and for implementing the program of the National Council of the Resistance.

Formation of the alliance of leftist forces in the 1970's was made significantly easier by the favorable changes in the international arena, particularly by the balance of political forces in favor of peace and socialism, and by the success of the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries promoted, and by the development of international cooperation in Europe, particularly between the Soviet Union and France. All this created conditions more favorable for the activity of the democratic forces, and at the same time it forged together to a certain extent the most reactionary and pro-Atlantic circles.

In advocating the formation of an alliance of leftist forces, the PCF started out from the need of class alliances and compromises in behalf of the struggle for democracy and socialism, of including wide popular masses in this struggle.

The French Communists constantly emphasized that "the objective of a unified front, of uniting the working-class and democratic forces, does not mean letting the bourgeoisie take the working class in tow under unprincipled alliances. This objective means attracting ever-wider masses to join the struggle against monopolies and their regime, the struggle for a new democracy and socialism."³ At the same time the Communists strived not to reduce all actions in favor of an alliance of leftist forces merely to discussions among the leaders of the leftist parties; and the alliance itself merely to an agreement among their "staffs." The leaders of the PCF constantly emphasized that it was of decisive importance to develop a powerful popular movement, to hold speeches locally in favor of the alliance of leftist forces, and to gain the support of the masses for the proposed program of measures against the monopolies.

In a speech before the plenum of the PCF Central Committee in June of 1972, G. Marchais said: "The success of this unprecedented experiment (the alliance of leftist force--E. D.) will depend in the final outcome on the ability of our party to gain the active support of the popular masses for the policy outlined jointly with the other leftist parties, for the struggle of the PCF to implement this policy; success will depend on our ability to create at every stage conditions favorable for overcoming the obstacles that will arise before long."⁴

The documents of the PCF also noted that the problems of unity could not be divorced from the class objectives, and that an unalterable condition for the co-operation of the PCF with the Socialists was renunciation by the latter of the policy of class cooperation with the bourgeoisie. At the 21st PCF Congress (in October 1974) it was emphasized that it was essential to clarify completely the problem of unity: "Whose unity, against whom, and for what."⁵

In many of the documents and speeches by PCF leaders it was also noted that at the same time the PCF was destined to play the role of the vanguard and to adopt clear class standpoints: "So far as we are concerned, we do not wish to conceal from the workers the true face of our party. To the contrary, we are doing everything possible to let them see clearly the distinguishing features of the Communist Party, its adherence to principles, its struggle, and its policies that are devoted completely to serving the interests of the working class, of the entire nation, of friendship among nations."⁶

Naturally the French Communists took into account what the Socialist Party stood for, and they noticed its vacillation and inconsistency, its petit bourgeois social makeup and its reformism. But the Communists reckoned that the Socialists had among their followers certain working strata, including a proportion of the working class, and that the unification of all working-class and democratic forces on a class basis, their cooperation in the struggle for common objectives, could become a powerful lever of social progress.

Confirming their determination to participate in this struggle the most actively and to assume the role of the vanguard in it, the Communists at the same time emphasized that they did not intend to monopolize this struggle but favored "loyal agreement of the democratic parties and organizations, cooperation among partners who retain their own character and have equal rights and obligations, on the basis of their pledge to actually fight for the democratic transformation of their country, for the advancement of socialism."⁷

In addition the Communists emphasized that under no circumstances would they participate in political combinations that in effect would mean the formation of

a government to administer the affairs of the bourgeoisie. The Communists had hoped to create such a balance of political forces that would compel the Socialists to renounce their policy of class cooperation and to honor their obligations. E. Fajon, a member of the PCF Politburo, wrote: "The question of the balance of power within the alliance of the leftist forces is the cardinal political question; on it depends the preservation and strengthening of the alliance, the success of the struggle for democracy and socialism."⁸

However, the practice of class struggle, the experience with the participation of the Communists and Socialists in the alliance of leftist forces based on their joint government program, and also the activity of this alliance proved much more complex and contradictory than what the participants had imagined initially. As V. I. Lenin wrote, "History in general, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in substance, more different and diverse, more lively and 'trickier' than the best parties and the most conscious vanguards of the most progressive classes imagine."⁹

The alliance of the leftist forces existed for about 6 years and actually disintegrated on the eve of the National Assembly elections held in March of 1978. To this day the debate has not subsided in France on the results and significance of this experiment in cooperation among leftist parties, on the causes of the alliance's disintegration. It is typical that today the most hypocritically distressed by the fate of the alliance are those who then did everything possible to prevent cooperation between the Communists and Socialists, and then to undermine the alliance--namely the bourgeoisie and the opportunists! They are attempting to shift full responsibility for the failure of the alliance of leftist forces on the Communists, in order to compromise the policies of the PCF, undermine its influence among the masses and cast doubt on the very idea of such an alliance. But such attempts are in vain. The idea of the unity of action in the struggle for their vital interests is deeply rooted in the awareness of the French workers.

Favorable Aspects and Shortcomings of the Joint Program

For a proper understanding of the nature of the alliance of leftist forces it is necessary to analyze in general outlines the content of the joint government program that became the basis of the alliance's activity.

The program was a political compromise reached by the three principal leftist parties in a situation of the intensifying crisis of state monopoly capitalism, and it reflected the peculiarities of the sociopolitical situation in France in the early 1970's. It was a compromise by the PCF as the progressive and revolutionary party of the working class, and by its inconsistent, vacillating and unreliable allies, the Socialists and the Left Radicals close to them, who retained their reformist nature.

As V. I. Lenin wrote, the proper tactic that communists adopt toward petit bourgeois democrats "must consist of utilizing these vacillations, and not of ignoring them; utilization means making concessions to those elements that are turning toward the proletariat, when and to the extent that they are doing so, together with struggle against those who are turning toward the bourgeoisie."¹⁰ At the same time Lenin emphasized the need to isolate the opportunistic elements and to attract to the communist side the best workers and the best representatives of the petite bourgeoisie. But he noted that this was a long and difficult process.

The purpose of the joint program was, among other things, to attract to the position of class struggle the Socialist Party and especially the workers among its followers, despite the vacillation and inconsistency of the leaders of this party. For the working class and other working strata the program set specific mobilizing objectives. It was a specific program of antimonopolistic measures whose realization would have significantly improved the situation of the workers, limited to a certain extent the power of big capital and of the monopolies, and made more democratic the country's economy and political life.

In terms of its objectives the joint program was generally democratic and did not contain measures of a socialist nature. In spite of its limited and compromising character, however, the program contained much that was favorable. This applies, for example, to social questions, which figured prominently in the program. It proposed urgent measures to improve the situation of the workers: higher wages, pensions and family allowances; the introduction of wage indexing; a shorter workweek without less pay; retirement at age 55 for women and at age 60 for men; measures to combat unemployment; the introduction of free medical care and free tuition; the expansion of housing construction; a democratic reform of education; measures to protect the health of mother and child, etc.¹¹

In other words, about one-half of the program was devoted to answering the question that was constantly on the agenda of political struggle: What must be done and how to improve the living and working conditions of the nation's wide working strata? These measures unquestionably met with the understanding and support of the workers. And it is no coincidence that the reaction fiercely attacked specifically the social part of the program, claiming that it was unrealistic and that the country lacked the resources for its realization.

The program also envisaged significant measures for nationalizing the economy. The Communists proposed to nationalize 25 basic monopolies and the entire financial and banking system, while the Socialists favored a smaller volume of nationalization within industry. In the end it was agreed to plan to nationalize the entire financial and banking system, the large insurance companies, and also nine large monopolies in key industries: engineering, aircraft, chemicals, electronics, and electrical engineering. On the whole the proposed nationalization was selective: it affected only large monopolies in individual industries. Of the approximately 700,000 industrial enterprises in France it was proposed to nationalize only 1 percent of their total number. The enterprises to be nationalized accounted for 9 percent of the total employment in industry and for about 15 percent of the gross output.¹²

But even this limited initiative met with the rabid resistance of the reaction that strived to frighten the owners of small and intermediate businesses by proclaiming that there would be "general nationalization." The program in fact did not call for the nationalization of small and medium businesses in industry and trade. To the contrary, the program spoke of retaining a considerable private sector within the economy; it was pointed out that the nationalization of banks would not affect the deposits of private individuals and companies; and the question of nationalizing agriculture was not raised. In agriculture the program proposed to retain private ownership of land, and also measures to improve the lot of small and medium farmers.

In the area of politics the program called for employing the existing forms and mechanisms of state power, provided they were made more democratic. Measures

were proposed to broaden and really guarantee democratic rights and freedoms, to introduce the principle of proportional representation in all elections, to broaden the rights of parliament and limit the powers of the president, and to rescind antidemocratic laws. The program started out from recognizing the multi-party system in France and the right of political parties to function, within the ruling coalition or in opposition.

The parties to the agreement undertook not to participate under any circumstances in a government based on a rightist coalition, and to remain loyal to the alliance of leftist forces and to the joint program.

Internationally the program started out from France's need to pursue an active and independent policy of cooperation, peaceful coexistence, detente and disarmament. The program emphasized that France would not return to NATO. The document stated: "If necessary, France will not refrain from concluding defensive alliances and nonaggression pacts."¹³

The PCF declared repeatedly that it did not regard the Socialists' consent to take France out of the North Atlantic Alliance as a precondition of an alliance with the PS. At the same time the Communists definitely supported the idea that France must be independent of any military-political bloc and of NATO in particular, and must refuse to participate in any organ of a national nature. The joint program stated that the democratic government "will demonstrate its determination to pursue the path of independence in relation to any military-political bloc. Possible problems concerning the obligations stemming from France's participation in the North Atlantic Alliance will be resolved in this spirit."¹⁴

The program deemed it essential that France halt the testing of nuclear weapons, participate in international talks on disarmament and accede to the international treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapons. There were provisions for France to renounce the use of strategic nuclear weapons in any form, to halt their production, and to convert the nuclear industry to peaceful uses.

On the whole, despite its compromising and limited nature, the joint program contained much that was favorable and met the needs of the democratic stage in the struggle of the French workers. It opened new possibilities for the working-class and democratic forces' unity of action in the struggle for the vital interests of the workers, for democratic changes, and for peace and detente.

But at the same time the program suffered from serious shortcomings that considerably limited its political effectiveness and undermined the base for uniting all democratic forces around the working class.

One such shortcoming was the nature of the political power that the parties to the joint program proposed to establish. Actually this basic question of any progressive political program was circumvented by silence. There is much said in the program about making political life and certain organs of state power more democratic, but not one word about the struggle to transfer political power to the workers. In fact all the proposed measures were to be implemented within the framework of the existing political and state system, which fostered in the workers certain illusions regarding the nature of the state in modern France and minimized the degree of inevitable resistance by the ruling class to the proposed measures.

Actually the joint program subordinated all political activity to the election campaigns and the elections themselves, regarding the ballot as the main instrument of the struggle and associating the possibility of democratic changes, and of new conquests by the workers, only with the elections, i.e., with the victory of the leftist forces in the elections and with the resulting formation of a leftist government by them. This approach reflected an obvious underestimation of mass struggle by the working class in its most diverse forms, examples of which abound in the political history of present-day France itself. Dooming the workers to expect "big elections," this standpoint led to a demobilization of the democratic forces, and to a weakening of the leading role of the working class and of its vanguard.

Another great shortcoming of the joint program was that it appeared to be primarily the product of negotiations among the leaders of the leftist parties, a result of an agreement "at the top": the wide working masses and even the ordinary members of these parties did not become fully involved in the mass demonstrations in support of this program, and of the ideas and proposals contained in it. Even though the program incorporated many essential demands and vital expectations of the workers, it never became their cause.

As stated in the resolutions of the 24th PCF Congress, after the adoption of the joint program "the illusion was created that the basic question concerning the content of the necessary changes had been settled in advance, that the task of uniting the popular forces in support of the decisions made at the top had already been accomplished, and that the Socialist Party was in agreement with these objectives . . . Specifically by virtue of its transforming content, the joint program obliterated the differences between the two parties and fostered illusions regarding the Socialist Party."¹⁵

These are merely some of the basic shortcomings of the joint program. In spite of the joint program's considerable political importance and response, these shortcomings significantly weakened the program's class nature and appeal.

Activity of the Alliance of Leftist Forces

Formation of the alliance of leftist forces helped to further polarize the socio-political forces. Many social organizations came out in support of the alliance, although the degree of their active participation varied. Such organizations were particularly the largest class-based trade-union organization, the General Labor Confederation (CGT), and the democratic organizations of youths, women, war veterans, etc. Many cultural personalities, a proportion of the Catholic circles, and certain representatives of the "Gaullist Left" expressed their solidarity with the leftist forces. Not all of them agreed fully with the ideas contained in the joint program, but to some extent or other they supported the alliance of leftist forces and their drive for democratic changes. The trade-union confederations close to the Socialists--the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) and the National Education Federation (FNE)--occupied such positions of partial support.

Of course, formation of the alliance of leftist forces did not resolve all the problems of relations among the participants and did not end dissent among them. Each party preserved its independence, principles and program, and each one attempted to strengthen its own position and influence. Moreover, cooperation

of the leftist parties took place under conditions of continuing competition among them, in a struggle for influence among the workers. Both the Communists and the Socialists were clearly aware of this. But there was an essential difference between the standpoints of the PCF and PS regarding relations with their partners and their obligations to the alliance of leftist forces.

The Communists viewed the alliance of leftist forces primarily as constant struggle to strengthen the solidarity of the working-class and democratic movements on a class basis, to achieve clear political objectives and influence among the workers, to gain for the joint program the support of all those who were suffering under the yoke of the monopolies, as a struggle against big capital, for democracy and socialism. The Communists remained faithful to their obligations assumed in the joint program, and they demanded the same behavior of their partners. As the 21st PCF Congress noted, the success of the alliance of leftist forces depended on the partners' adherence to the basic provisions of the joint program, "on competition between the partners such that does not aim to strengthen the position of one at the expense of the other, to allow one partner to force his will on the other."¹⁶ "The struggle for unity is not a struggle between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. It is the struggle of the masses for unity."¹⁷

The standpoint of the Socialist Party's leadership was quite different. From the very beginning the leaders of the Socialists strived to make use of their participation in the alliance of leftist forces not so much to fight for democratic changes, as the workers demanded, but rather to alter the balance of power within the alliance in their favor, to strengthen the influence of the PS at the expense of the Communist Party.

In practice these differences in the standpoints of the PCF and PS found their expression in the following: While the Communists strived persistently for a changeover to joint action on the most timely problems, the leadership of the PS often declined to participate and continued to pursue a two-faced policy--to rely on the workers' aspirations for social progress, but at the same time not to commit themselves for the future and to avoid a decisive break with big capital, domestically as well as internationally. All this weakened the alliance of leftist forces and hampered its activity.

The Communists held that actions in defense of the workers's interests were the best means of strengthening the alliance, and also a test of the alliance's strength and viability. The Socialists did not hasten to participate in such actions, and occasionally they refused outright to participate in them. However, the unfolding political events compelled them from time to time to switch to the position of class struggle.

One of the first serious tests for the alliance of leftist forces was the National Assembly elections in March of 1973, eight months after the adoption of the joint program. The existence of the alliance of leftist forces lent the election campaign a sharper, class character.

The leftist parties conducted their political campaigns separately, completely preserving their specifics and directing their main effort toward explaining the alliance of leftist forces and the joint program that was not widely known to the public at that time. At the same time the reaction did everything

possible to distort the policies of the leftist parties, especially of the PCF, slandering their program.

The Communists conducted their campaign loyally, without attacking their partners. But the Socialists attempted to undermine the position of the PCF and often worked together with the bourgeoisie. In addition, the ruling parties directed their main thrust against the PCF and noticeably spared the Socialists, attempting to cause in this manner a split within the alliance of leftist forces. The Communists' active support of the joint program, without differencing themselves clearly from the reformist policies of the PS, resulted in that the public often lost sight of the dividing line between the Communists and Socialists, and the Socialists to a certain extent were able to enjoy the fruits of the activity that the Communists conducted in behalf of the alliance of leftist forces.

The outcome of the elections showed a sharp shift to the left. The leftist parties jointly received 11 million votes or more than 46 percent of the total votes cast, which was considerably more than in the previous elections in 1968. The PCF candidates received over 5.0 million votes or 21.25 percent of the total, 0.7 million more than in 1968. The number of Communist deputies more than doubled (from 33 to 73). The socialists received 4.58 million votes or 18.8 percent of the total, 1.28 million more than in the 1968 elections.

Thus already in 1973 trends were noticeable indicating that the alliance of leftist forces, on the basis and in the form it functioned, was more advantageous for the Socialists than for the Communists. This was a serious signal that gave the French communists food for thought.¹⁹

In spite of the dissent that persisted among the participants of the alliance of leftist forces, however, they often were able to undertake joint actions on individual timely domestic political and international issues.

For example, the actions undertaken on the initiative of the leftist parties in June of 1973 to defend democratic rights, and also the general strike and the Day of Action in protest against the high cost of living, in December of that same year, were of a mass nature. In 1974, documents were elaborated and adopted jointly, and on their basis joint actions were taken on international monetary issues, against the dominance of international monopolies, on questions of international trade, and certain other problems. In 1975, the partners in the alliance of leftist forces, and the Communist in particular, undertook extensive efforts to explain the true causes of the deep economic crisis that afflicted France and the entire capitalist world. They headed the struggle against the ruling circles' policy of "economic austerity" that affected workers the most severely; they organized mass actions in the struggle against unemployment, winning guaranteed employment and a halt to mass layoffs; and at the same time they explained that a real solution to the social problems could be achieved only by a change of policies, based on the leftist forces' joint program. All these actions helped to unfold the workers' struggle for their vital interests, for democratic changes.

Joint actions were undertaken also on certain international issues. Thus in the autumn of 1973, after the fascist coup in Chile, the leftist parties organized a huge campaign of solidarity with the Chilean Democrats. Numerous meetings and demonstrations were held throughout entire France, at which the Communists, Socialists and representatives of other democratic organization demanded that

the crimes against the Chilean people be stopped. Solidarity with the people and the National Unity government of Chile was one of the constant topics of joint actions by the leftist forces in France. There were joint actions also in support of strengthening peace and detente, and of developing European co-operation. The leftist parties repeatedly offered various initiatives to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between France and the Soviet Union, advancing particularly the idea of concluding a friendship agreement. In 1975, the leftist parties launched a joint campaign of solidarity with the Democrats of Spain, and of protest against the crimes of the Franco regime.

However, the leftist forces did not succeed in organizing and heading a truly mass movement among the workers in support of their political program.

Preelection campaigns obviously occupied the key position in the activity of the alliance. This followed from the political orientation that the partners in the alliance attributed to their joint program. Elections to the National Assembly were held twice during the alliance's existence, in 1973 and 1978. There were also early presidential elections in 1974, provincial elections in 1976, and municipal elections in 1977. Hardly had one election campaign ended when the next one began. It should be borne in mind that election campaigns and elections in present-day France are one of the important forms of class struggle, and that the leftist forces in France are actively taking advantage of general suffrage and other democratic rights, won by the workers, to strengthen their positions in the struggle for the workers' vital interests.

Causes of the Leftist Alliance's Disintegration

The fact that the alliance of leftist forces was an alliance at the top, and also the predominance of preelection campaigns over all other forms of political struggle imposed certain costs on the working-class movement because the elections were held under unequal conditions under an unfair electoral system that favored the ruling parties. But even under these conditions the leftist forces were occasionally able to score significant results in the elections.

This was specifically the case in the presidential elections of 1974 when the leftist forces ran a joint candidate, F. Mitterrand. Thanks to the support of the PCF, he obtained over 12 million votes or 49.2 percent of the total, which was significantly more than the number of votes the leftist parties obtained in the National Assembly elections of 1973. Of special significance was the fact that these votes were cast for a candidate running on a progressive program that recognized the need to include the Communists in the government to be formed.

Also on this occasion the Socialists attempted to attribute the achieved results to their political aktiv, and to take advantage of them to strengthen the position of their own party. To a certain extent they were successful because the Communists, similarly as in the 1973 election campaign, had toned down their criticism of the PS leadership's reformist policies, and thus the fundamental differences between the two parties had been actually obscured.

Participation in the alliance of leftist forces enabled the Socialists to restore to a considerable extent the influence and organization of their party. Thus the membership of the PS more than doubled in 1971-1976, reaching 180,000, and the number of its local party organizations, at institutions and even at

certain industrial enterprises, increased. Relying on the results of the presidential elections, the Socialist Party openly began to claim the role of the largest political party in France. Encouraged in this in every possible way by the national and international bourgeoisie, the leaders of the PS began to pursue more and more openly a divisive policy and to pave the way for the possible formation of a spare Social Democratic variant of the ruling coalition. As noted at the 22d PCF Congress held in February of 1976, the bourgeoisie "is striving to create conditions under which the Socialist Party, having attained the leading role in the camp of leftist forces, could revert to the practice of class cooperation and ensure thereby preservation of the dominance of big capital, in the same way that the socialist parties are doing in a number of other European countries."²⁰

Avoiding to join the struggle on the side of the working class, the leaders of the PS rejected in the summer of 1974 a proposal of the PCF to stage actions and meetings in the larger cities of France in support of the workers' vital demands. The rightist leaders of the PS supported the ideas of the Atlantic Alliance and of West European integration, and in many respects they leaned toward the policies of NATO and of the Socialist International. After the antifascist revolution in Portugal, they rejected the proposal of the PCF to launch a joint campaign of solidarity with the Portuguese Democrats. The burden of anticomunist prejudices, the pressure of the French and international bourgeoisie and the links to big capital were reflected in the policies of the Socialist Party's leadership, and they were showing a growing tendency to renege on their obligations under the joint program.

It should be noted that the activity of the alliance of leftist forces took place under conditions of constant attacks by the bourgeoisie, whose main thrust was invariably directed against the Communists. Using all the mass media, the ruling circles unleashed a virtual "ideological war" against the PCF and the working-class movement. Anticomunist and anti-Soviet campaigns are a permanent feature of the ideological situation in France, and this cannot help but affect the working-class movement.

The imperialist circles of the United States and NATO likewise exerted constant pressure on France and the French public, interfering repeatedly in France's internal affairs and striving to keep the working-class movement and especially the Communist Party from gaining strength and to prevent Communist participation in government. The Socialist International likewise acted in this direction, encouraging the leaders of the French Socialists in their attempts to undermine the influence of the PCF. Under the conditions of intensifying class struggle, opportunistic elements became noticeably more active within the working-class movement in France, similarly as in certain other capitalist countries.

As V. I. Lenin noted, the main thing about opportunism is the idea of class co-operation with the bourgeoisie.²¹ He wrote: "Among the practical questions of policy in every individual or specific historical moment it is important to be able to distinguish, clarify and combat by every effort the ones that represent the principal type of unpermissible, treacherous compromises incorporating opportunism that is fatal for the revolutionary class."²²

The principal manifestations of opportunism within the French working-class movement in the 1970's were the attempts to question the relevance of Marxism-Leninism, of revolutionary theory, for the working-class movement in the developed

capitalist countries. The hypothesis that Marxism-Leninism was not "applicable" to the working-class movement in these countries was exploited extensively for attacks against the theory of scientific socialism, by bourgeois ideologues and reformists as well as by opportunists within the ranks of the working-class movement itself. Speculating on the Communists' natural urge to perfect their own strategy and tactics and to take national and historical peculiarities into account when formulating their policies, the opportunists call for abandoning Marxism-Leninism, claiming that it has become obsolete, and that the path to socialism in present-day France has to be sought as a third path, "between social democracy and Soviet socialism." Specifically this is the gist of the "findings" of one of the most militant French revisionists, the renegade Ellenstein, who in the 1970's published many books and brochures in which he propagated his opportunistic views. Of course, especially sharp are the attacks against the revolutionary conclusions and works of V.I. Lenin and of the CPSU.

Opportunism is one of the serious obstacles to strengthening the unity of the French working-class movement on a class basis, to the unity of action of the working-class and democratic forces. The opportunists attempted to divert the working-class movement to the path of reformism and compromise, and to pressure the PCF into making further concessions to the Socialists and into abandoning class struggle. Opportunism actually played into the hands of social democracy.

As another manifestation of opportunism dangerous for the working class, there were the attempts to question the ideas of proletarian internationalism and solidarity, to "prove" that internationalism could harm the efforts of the Communists to increase their influence among the workers. The opportunists contrasted the principle of the communist and worker parties' independence with the ideas of international solidarity and called for dissociation from the socialist countries. Also its partners within the alliance of leftist forces tried to exert pressure on the PCF in this respect as well. The opportunists usually gave their attacks against internationalism an anti-Soviet form. They attempted to isolate the working-class movement and communist parties of the capitalist countries, and to belittle and discredit the experience with real socialism. For example, the book "The USSR and We" was written specifically in this spirit, by a group of authors who were members of the PCF.²³

The divisive policies of the PS leadership, the pressure exerted by big capital and also by NATO and the Socialist International, the "ideological war" that the bourgeoisie is waging constantly against the working-class movement and primarily against the PCF, the manifestations of opportunism within the working-class movement--all these were facts that served to weaken the class foundation of the alliance of leftist forces and created conditions that led to the abandonment of the joint program by the Socialists and to the actual disintegration of the alliance of leftist forces.

The Socialists rejected a PCF proposal to renew the joint program and demanded further concessions of the Communists. But as a resolution of the PCF Central Committee noted, "the Communist Party has reached the limit of concessions, and to cross this limit would jeopardize the ability of a government of leftist forces to introduce the necessary changes."²⁴

The polemic between the partners in the alliance of leftist forces became especially sharp at the end of 1977. The leftist forces were divided as they approached the next elections to the National Assembly, in March of 1978, and

this necessarily caused a certain amount of confusion among the workers and undermined the prospects of the leftist forces. Nearly 50 percent of the electorate cast their votes for the leftist parties, but the rightist parties retained their majority in the National Assembly. The elections showed common gains for the leftist parties, but again the Socialist obtained a larger proportion of the votes, in the same way as they had in 1973. The Communists attained better results in many working-class centers. But in certain regions of the country, including the industrial cities in the "Red Belt" around Paris, the proportion of Communist votes was lower by 3 to 4 percentage points than in the previous elections. For the first time during the years of the Fifth Republic, the Socialists gained more votes than the Communists.

The difference between the votes received by the PCF and PS in the elections (about 2 percentage points) was not what the leaders of the Socialist Party had expected, but the results could not help but cause concern among the Communists. And although the Communists received 20.6 percent of the total votes cast, they regarded the outcome of the elections as a defeat. As noted in the statement issued by the PCF Politburo, "The results scored by the leftist forces are of course not what millions of men and women had hoped for, who correctly see democratic changes as the only way out of the present crisis, onto the path of social progress and democracy, and who had such great expectations regarding these elections."²⁵

The workers' disillusionment was the greater because the partners in the alliance of leftist forces had oriented them toward struggle for victory in the elections as the principal path of the struggle for democratic changes.

It became clear that the alliance of leftist forces, in the form in which it then existed, had no future. A period arrived for regrouping the leftist forces, for sober and critical evaluation of the previous experience, and to prepare for the coming political battles. The French Communists strived to draw from this experience the necessary lessons and conclusions, and this was done specifically at the 23d PCF Congress, in May of 1979.

Some Lessons of the Alliance of Leftist Forces

Analysis of the political situation and of the distribution of class forces in France in the 1970's, of the leftist alliance's activity and program, and of the policies of the alliance's partners, gives reason to expect that an assessment of the experience with this alliance cannot be unambiguous.

The alliance of leftist forces was an important political factor that had a significant influence on the course of class struggle. It helped to create new possibilities for defending the rights of the workers and for developing the working-class and democratic movements.

But the French working class failed to achieve its main objective--to make the alliance of leftist forces an effective instrument of the struggle for the workers' vital interests, for democratic changes and socialism, under the vanguard role of the Communist Party in this alliance. One of the basic shortcomings of the alliance of leftist forces was that to a considerable extent it remained an "alliance at the top" and did not receive sufficiently strong and active support from the working class and other working strata. The PCF directed its activity toward ensuring such support, but it failed to do so.

The experience with the alliance of leftist forces confirmed that the strength of political alliances, their durability and effectiveness depend decisively on reliance on the workers, on the degree of support that the working class and its allies render the concluded agreements and compromises. The adoption of a joint program did not in itself guarantee the success of the leftist forces, and some provisions in the program had not yet gained sufficient support among the popular masses. According to the assessment that G. Marchais presented at the 23d PCF Congress, "the fact that the alliance, within the framework of the joint program, was erroneously regarded primarily as an alliance at the top had a demobilizing effect."²⁶

Moreover, adoption "at the top" of a joint program, even of a progressive one with an antimonopolistic content, but without sufficient support among the workers, created the illusion that the realization of this program also depended basically on the leaders of the leftist parties, that the key to the solution of the problems lay in the program itself, and that elections were of decisive importance, while the other forms of mass struggle were relegated to a secondary role.

Another important conclusion concerns the nature of the alliance of leftist forces. The experience of the French and international working-class movement indicates that political alliances and compromises benefit the working class only when they are concluded with complete ideological clarity, preserving the political independence of its party, without concealing the class standpoints, without relaxing the ideological and political struggle for its principles. As V. I. Lenin said, "strong are only those fighters who rely on the conscious real interests of certain classes, and any concealment of these class interests that already play the dominant role in modern society only serves to weaken the fighters."²⁷

Lenin's conclusion has been fully confirmed that the formation of political alliances and the reaching of compromises in the course of revolutionary struggle cannot take place at the cost of renouncing one's principles, and that it is absolutely essential that in the course of this the Communist Party retain its independence in pursuing its own policies and also in criticising its opponents as well as its partners in the alliance.

Communists cannot be partners in an unprincipled alliance "at any cost," and even less at the cost of abandoning their class standpoints and of dissolving in a general democratic coalition. On this also the French Communists were unanimous at their 23d party congress: "The experience of struggle within the framework of the joint program shows that an alliance must be under the workers' constant control. It must be formed in a situation of complete clarity, without embellishing the standpoints of our partners, without concealing that which unites us, and also what continues to divide us."

One of the most important conclusions that the French Communists drew from their experience with the alliance of leftist forces is the need to constantly strengthen the party ideologically, politically and organizationally, its influence among the masses and especially within the working class, and its vanguard role in the working-class movement as a guaranty of this movement's success. As G. Marchais said at the 23 PCF Congress, "This lesson states that the formation, maintenance and development of an alliance in the struggle for democratic changes cannot proceed successfully without the existence and reinforcement of the revolutionary party."²⁹

The resolutions adopted by the 23d PCF Congress also note that "the inadequate influence of the Communist Party, the shifting of the balance of leftist forces at the expense of the Communist Party, and the widening of the gap in favor of the Socialist Party lead the popular forces into a blind alley, to a renunciation of the struggle for changes, to defeat. To strengthen the Communist Party's influence, its ability to take action and its organization is an urgent necessity in order to extricate ourselves from the crisis and to ensure the country's democratic progress toward socialism, with due consideration for the national peculiarities of France."³⁰

The French Communists have done a considerable amount of work in recent years to strengthen their party and its influence among the workers. During the past 10 years the membership of the PCF has nearly doubled; it now has over 700,000 members.³¹ More than 90,000 new members joined the party in 1980, and more than half of them are blue-collar workers.³² Since 1970, the number of PCF locals at industrial enterprises, institutions and schools has doubled. But the Communists reckon that this is not enough, and that there are considerable possibilities for the further growth of the party and for strengthening its position, especially within the working class. They are setting for themselves substantial tasks in the area of improving ideological and theoretical work and propaganda, in developing intraparty life on the principles of democratic centralism.

The experience of class struggle during the years of the leftist alliance's existence clearly revealed also the immense importance to the working class and its party of adherence to Lenin's ideas on internationalism. Through their own experience the French Communists have become convinced that any attempt to loosen the ties of international solidarity and to distance themselves from real socialism and from other present-day revolutionary forces not only fails to provide any advantage in the struggle for the masses, but to the contrary it harms the party's position and influence among the workers. The integral unity of internationalism and patriotism has always been and will remain an important source of the working-class movement's strength and success. As G. Marchais emphasises in his book "The Hope of Today," "It would be a serious mistake to attempt to gradually isolate our actions from those of other forces that are struggling in the world against capitalism, for socialism."³³

As evident from the resolutions adopted by the 24th PCF Congress in February of 1982, the French Communists are resisting attempts to persuade their party to abandon its consistently internationalist standpoint. They have been able to preserve and multiply the combat traditions of internationalism formed during the many years of working-class struggle. The PCF is the only political party in France to adopt a standpoint of active solidarity with the Afghan revolution and with Soviet aid to the people and government of Afghanistan, despite the fierce anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign of the class enemy. The French Communists resolutely condemned the Chinese aggression against socialist Vietnam and supported, as before, the just struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The PCF adopted a responsible class attitude to the events in Poland and opposed all attempts by reactionary forces to exert pressure on the Polish People's Republic and to undermine socialism in that country. The French Communists are unmasking the anti-Soviet and anti-Polish campaigns and are speaking out to prevent the "internationalization of the Polish problem" and the formation of a focus of tension in the center of Europe.

In the present international situation, which has become complex through the fault of the imperialist circles in the United States and within NATO, the PCF regards the struggle for peace, detente and disarmament as one of its most important internationalist tasks. It was one of the initiators of holding in Paris in April of 1980 the meeting of the European communist and worker parties, for peace and disarmament. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in his report to the 26th CPSU Congress, this meeting provided a new stimulus to the struggle against the danger of war and helped to activize the struggle of the popular masses against the serious threat hanging over Europe as a result of the NATO bloc's decision to install the new Americal nuclear missile in Western Europe.³⁴

The experience with class struggle in France in the 1970's has led the country's democratic forces to modify in certain respects their attitude to elections as the principal instrument capable of ensuring progress toward democracy and socialism. The workers have been convinced once again that in the struggle for their vital interests they must not set their hopes solely on elections, regardless of how important they may be, and that merely waiting passively for the elections, without pursuing mass political struggle in all its forms, could only weaken the working-class movement. As G. Seguy, the secretary general of the CGT, announced: "The time is past when the workers expected the satisfaction of their demands from the next elections."³⁵ Thanks specifically to mass struggle, headed by the Communists, the French workers have been able to repeatedly achieve significant results in safeguarding their interests.

Analyzing the balance sheet of the alliance of leftist forces, the French Communists note that the activity of the alliance, in spite of its shortcomings, did produce some favorable results. According to a comment at the 23d PCF Congress, "even though the six years of struggle based on the joint program did not lead, as we had hoped, to the defeat of the right-wing forces and to the necessary changes, they nonetheless produced some results whose favorable nature is indisputable."³⁶ Among such results we may include the fact that the leftist alliance's struggle based on the joint program "made it possible to counter the attempts of capital to shift responsibility for all the consequences of the crisis onto the workers," "it provided a better understanding of the need for anticapitalist reforms, and for new solutions to extricate ourselves from the new type of crisis," and "it enhanced the expansion of our positions within the electoral organs and the party's growth as well."³⁷

Indeed, for the first time in the postwar period, an alliance of three leftist parties was formed on a basis of a joint program of an antimonopolistic nature. Under the conditions of a further intensification of the class contradictions, caused by the deepening of the crisis of capitalism in the mid-1970's, this alliance became one of the basic factors of the country's political life. It offered a real political alternative to the existing regime, and also measures for a democratic resolution of the crisis. The joint program adopted by the leftist parties reflected the most essential demands of the workers and their aspirations for democratic changes. And the important thing was that for the first time the Socialists pledged not to participate in a government based on a right-wing coalition.

The alliance of leftist forces had no small favorable influence on the development of the working-class and democratic movements and helped to attract to class struggle new strata of workers. This was an attempt to win over to the side of the working class the overwhelming majority of those who were being exploited by big capital and the monopolies. The alliance helped to strengthen,

gradually although not evenly, the influence of all its partners, as evident from the results of the national elections and also from the growth of the membership of the PCF and PS. For the first time during the years of the Fifth Republic, half of the electorate voted for the leftist parties and for the democratic measures that they proposed, the realization of which would have dealt a severe blow to the power of big capital and of the monopolies.

The influence of the partners in the alliance of leftist forces was mutual. The Socialists did win certain concessions from the PCF, but the participation of the Socialist Party in the alliance against the monopolies produced certain shifts in its position. During those years the Socialists took part to some extent in the struggle for democratic changes, and they adopted more realistic standpoints on international issues.

The alliance of leftist forces influenced the development of not only the domestic political events. If we consider that all partners in the alliance, and the Communists in particular, supported detente, disarmament and the strengthening of French-Soviet friendship, and that they succeeded in undertaking certain joint actions on international questions, the alliance did play a significant role in developing certain positive trends in the foreign policy of France, in strengthening France's independence, helped to expand French-Soviet relations and curbed the manifestations of Atlanticism in French foreign policy.

Finally, the workers and Communists of France gained valuable experience in class struggle, in the struggle for democratic changes, for the unity of the working class. V. I. Lenin repeatedly wrote about the great and unique significance of the masses' own experience, including their failures and defeats, for the political education of the workers, for their ability and skill to wage their political struggle.

The 23d and 24th PCF Congresses confirmed that the PCF would remain loyal to its policy of maintaining an alliance of leftist forces, which the Communists regard as a strategic policy, one that does not depend on the fluctuations of the domestic political situation. The Communists continue to regard as their important task the struggle for the unity of the working-class and democratic forces. They are advocating the formation of a new and more durable alliance, a clearer class approach to the problems of political alliances, and the ensuring of unity "from below" through the workers' class actions. Both these congresses defined as tasks of primary importance the strengthening of the Communist Party and of its influence among the workers, which will serve as an important guaranty of the durability of political alliances.

In the Struggle for Democratic Changes

The presidential elections, and then the early National Assembly elections in May and June of 1981 were expressions of the workers' strong aspiration for unity and joint action in favor of democratic changes, against the policies of big capital and the monopolies. The right-wing parties, whose policies led to an intensification of the economic crisis and to social and economic problems, suffered a serious defeat. For the first time during the years of the Fifth Republic, a representative of the leftist opposition, F. Mitterrand, the leader of the Socialist Party, was elected president. This was made possible because in the second round of the elections the PCF supported him; with its long years of consistent struggle it contributed decisively toward the creation of conditions

for defeating the coalition of right-wing parties, forming a leftist majority and electing the new president. The Communists have always supported the ideas of a unity of action and of forming an alliance of leftist forces as a very important instrument in the struggle for profound democratic changes. But at the same time they had learned their lesson from the alliance of leftist forces of the 1970's and conducted their election campaign independently, on the basis of a "plan of struggle" proposed by the party, and of their own political demands, one of which from the very beginning was the formation of a leftist government with Communist participation.

In distinction from the presidential elections of 1973, the PCF ran its own candidate. For the first time in the party's history, its candidate was its general secretary, G. Marchais; he was the only candidate who promised radical democratic changes that would pave the way to socialism. By running their own candidate and appealing to the workers to give him wide support, the French Communists strived to unite around the PCF the widest possible working strata, considering this as the principal and necessary condition for the success of the struggle for democracy and social progress. Striving to form a new and more durable alliance of leftist forces and also a government in which all leftist parties would participate, they constantly emphasized that the key to decisive changes was the existence of a strong and influential Communist Party that had the active support of the working class and popular masses and was able to play the role of vanguard.

As G. Marchais announced at one of the meetings during the election campaign, "it is necessary to form from the very beginning a government of the alliance of leftist forces, one that will be the most effective and will rely decisively on the people. Such a government cannot be imagined without Communist ministers. Otherwise the forces of capital would remain masters of the situation, regardless of the outcome of the elections."³⁸ The forceful campaign that G. Marchais conducted with the support of the entire party helped the workers to better understand the nature and objectives of this policy, to unite the PCF and mobilize the working-class and democratic forces in the struggle for democracy and social progress, and for France's independence in the conduct of its foreign policy.

The Communists waged their struggle under the difficult conditions of an unbridled campaign organized by the ruling parties against the PCF and its candidate. The bourgeoisie literally used every means to isolate the Communist Party and to prevent its representatives from gaining control of the country's government. The PCF candidate was actually opposed by all the other candidates, from the far right to the left, who believed that their most important objective was to disorient the supporters of the PCF. To this end the reactionary forces made extensive use of the methods of frightening the voters, by raising the "Communist threat" and the prospects of economic shocks.

The French Communists note that to a certain extent the outcome of the elections was also a result of the policy that the PCF pursued during the years of the leftist alliance's existence. As G. Marchais said at the plenum of the PCF Central Committee (on 24-25 June 1981), "the policy of our party during this period resulted in that essentially we ourselves supported the idea that the party as such had to exist so that changes could take place in France . . . The joint program fostered illusions regarding the Socialist Party, creating the impression that

it had changed to such an extent that the distinctions between our parties (the PCF and the PS) have disappeared."³⁹

The outcome of the presidential elections, and then the election of a leftist majority to the National Assembly created a new political situation, reflecting the significant shift to the left in the mood of the voters and in the balance of political forces. In the country there was formed a new presidential and parliamentary majority whose makeup included the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and also certain other democratic organizations. And although the balance of power within this majority was unfavorable for the PCF, the president and the leadership of the Socialist Party had to face the fact that Mitterrand's election would not have been possible without Communist support.

Despite the fact that the Communists lost 1.5 million votes in the elections to the National Assembly, the PCF remains strong and the best organized political force, the vanguard in the struggle for the workers' vital interests, for democratic changes and socialism, for the solidarity of all working-class and democratic forces. This permitted the conclusion of a political agreement between the PCF and the PS concerning the principal directions of government policy, on the basis of which four representatives of the Communist Party became ministers, for the first time since 1947, in the government headed by a Socialist, Pierre Mauroy. Under the new circumstances the Communists and the Socialists did not prepare a joint document in the nature of a program and, having pledged government solidarity within the framework of the concluded broad agreement, they are preserving at the same time their complete political independence and their ability to continue their political activity in accordance with their own ideas and principles.

Thus a government of leftist forces has been formed in France with Communist participation. This has been a result of the significant shift in the balance of political forces, and also a recognition of the authority of the PCF as the party of the working class, of its leading role in safeguarding the workers' interests.

Despite the pressure exerted by imperialism, the formation and activity of a government with Communist participation in the present complex domestic and international situation have dealt a serious blow to anticommunism and have created conditions objectively more favorable for continuing the struggle for the workers' vital interests and for social progress.

The election results simultaneously reflected the considerable inhomogeneity of the working-class and democratic movements, and the considerable differences in the workers' political awareness. Most voters were seized by a desire to do away with the economic policy of austerity, which was leading France ever deeper into a blind alley of crisis, and with the political system's conservatism and archaism. But not all of them by far had a clear notion of what changes were necessary and how they were to be achieved. Many of them voted not so much for Mitterrand, but rather against V. Giscard d'Estaing.

After the presidential elections of 1974, when F. Mitterrand received 13 million votes, G. Seguy wrote: "A certain number of these votes merely reflected a deep desire for change, great dissatisfaction and the wish to drive out the right-wing forces: who or what was unimportant so long as everything changed. This demonstrates, among other things, that dissatisfaction and a desire for change are not synonymous with revolutionariness and political awareness."⁴⁰ This evaluation is fully applicable also to the results of the 1981 presidential elections.

The French Communists are attempting to analyze carefully and comprehensively the results of the held elections and the new political situation, and to draw the necessary conclusions for their policy. An extensive and thorough discussion of these problems was held at the 24th PCF Congress, at which the Communists reviewed the party's policy in the preceding period and considered its tasks at the present stage. The congress approved the party's strategy to unite and unify all the working-class and democratic forces in the struggle for the workers' interests, for democratic changes and socialism. In the proceedings of the 24th PCF Congress we read: "The resolutions of our preceding 23d congress have been presented persistently as rejection of the policy of the leftist alliance. In fact the exact opposite is true, and our participation in the new majority is convincing proof of this. Striving to overcome the obstacles that broke up the alliance and to revive it on a clear and solid foundation, we have drawn the lessons from our past experience and have worked out a new concept of the alliance."⁴¹

Turning once again to a critical analysis of the alliance of leftist forces based on the joint program, the congress delegates noted that a serious shortcoming of that period had been the underestimation of the exceptional importance of the actions of the workers themselves, of developing a strong popular movement in support of the ideas advanced by the party. The significance of strengthening the independent class positions of the PCF had likewise been underestimated, which in the final outcome led to a certain loss of party influence. The congress delegates noted that in the 1970's the PCF--limited by the proposal concerning the intermediate stage, the objectives of which had not been defined with sufficient clarity in the joint program--actually helped to smooth the differences among the partners in the alliance of leftist forces and to foster illusions regarding the policy of the Socialist Party. Having thoroughly analyzed from class positions the crisis of capitalism in France, the Communists oriented the working class and the workers toward struggle for democratic changes and socialism, with due consideration for the country's historical and national peculiarities. The resolutions adopted by the congress state: "The crisis cannot be resolved without society's progress along the socialist path. There is no other solution."⁴² The French Communists' proposed way out of the crisis is the path of an alliance of all the working-class and democratic forces, on a class basis; it is the path of relentless struggle to change the balance of social and political forces and to create conditions for the increased political role of the working class and of its vanguard, the Communist Party.

The PCF is warning the workers not to foster any illusions and is constantly emphasizing that they should not expect gifts "from above," and that the activity of the government, even with Communist participation, is not sufficient guaranty of changes that will meet the workers' interests; the struggle for democratic changes that pave the way for socialism is the cause of the workers themselves.

In his report to the 24th PCF Congress, G. Marchais said: "Our strategy has nothing in common with the lulling concept of gradual and smooth evolution, under which there remains nothing else to do but wait for the voters to go to the polls every 5 or 7 years. To limit the popular movement's role to passive support of a government to which it entrusted the task of transforming society would mean turning everything upside down and dooming ourselves to defeat. We will succeed in making changes only with the help of our nation's wide-scale, conscious and decisive actions. Nothing can and will change in France without expressing the nation's will, constantly and everywhere."⁴³

The democratic forces in France realize that the situation in their country is exceptionally complex and contradictory. The domestic and international reaction is stepping up the economic, political and ideological pressure to break up this new and in many respects unprecedented experiment in cooperation among the leftist parties of France, to split the leftist majority and isolate the Communist Party. The right-wing forces suffered a serious defeat in the elections, but they are retaining the real levers of power and their dominant influence in the economy, government apparatus and mass media. Introduction of the first socioeconomic measures that meet the workers' interests evoked the most violent resistance of big capital and the right-wing parties. Reactionary circles and the right-wing Social Democrats are continuing to wage a fierce campaign against the Communist Party, attempting to push it from its class positions. Within the leftist majority itself, moreover, there are forces who fear the growing political role of the working class and therefore are attempting to limit the working-class and democratic movements and to channel them into social democratic reformism.

The French Communists note that cooperation of the PCF, the workers' militant vanguard that relies on revolutionary theory, with a Socialist Party of a reformist nature, especially when the balance of power is unfavorable for the Communist Party, confronts them with complex tasks. The final resolution of the 24th PCF Congress states: "Alliance with a Socialist Party that differs considerably from the Communist Party in terms of its history, social composition, ideology, organization, international ties and strategy, confronts a revolutionary party such as ours with a complex problem."⁴⁴

But at the same time there has emerged and remained a wide base for joint action by the working-class and democratic forces, and also for cooperation among the leftist parties, especially on the questions of struggle for a democratic way out of the crisis.

The Communists have rated the first socioeconomic measures of the government (the nationalization of banks and monopolies; measures to raise the workers' living standard; a reform granting the local organs more authority; and certain other measures) as favorable and proceeding in the right direction, but inadequate and inconsistent. Under the present conditions of fierce struggle over the course of the government's policies, the PCF sees one of its principal tasks in preserving and strengthening its political independence on a class and internationalist basis, in maximally promoting at every level, including within the government, the introduction of democratic changes that meet the workers' interests, in mobilizing the popular masses in support of radical changes, and in strengthening in this manner the party's influence. This task is complex, and in many respects a new one for the PCF. The resolutions of the 24th PCF Congress state: "From now on the party of class struggle, our party, is a member of the ruling majority, a party participating in government. For the overwhelming majority of the party's members, this is an entirely new situation."⁴⁵

The victory of the leftist democratic forces in the elections in May and June of 1981 and the participation of the Communists in government reflected the important changes in the political life of France. As evident from the resolutions of the 23d and 24th PCF Congresses, the French Communists are continuing to fight for their objectives along the path of uniting all working-class and democratic forces on an antimonopolistic basis: for increasing in every possible way the political role of the working class and of its militant vanguard,

the Communist Party; and for strengthening international solidarity with all the present-day revolutionary and liberation forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress), Moscow, 1981, pp 18-19.
2. Manifesto of the French Communist Party, "Pour une democratie avancee, pour une France socialiste" (For an Advanced Democracy, for a Socialist France), Paris, 1969, p 8.
3. V. Roche, "Izbrannyye stat'i i rechi" (Selected Articles and Speeches), Moscow, 1972, p 459.
4. Quoted from E. Fajon, "L'union est combat" (The Alliance Is Combat), Paris, 1975, pp 124-125.
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RECENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAZIL SURVEYED

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[Article by Professor Anatoliy Nikolayevich Glinkin, doctor of historical sciences, chief of the Department of the History, Geography and International Relations of Countries, Latin American Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Present-Day Brazil"]

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Country, Population, Government

Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, occupies nearly half of the South American continent. In terms of area (8,512,000 square kilometers) it is the world's fifth largest country, after the Soviet Union, Canada, the People's Republic of China and the United States. In terms of population (121 million) it ranks sixth in the world.

The vast territory of Brazil is endowed with the most diverse natural resources. The fertile red soils, in combination with constant warm weather and sufficient precipitation (except in the arid northeast), yield several harvests a year for many of the crops grown. The country has the world's largest stands of tropical forests in the Amazon Basin (60 percent of the entire area), an extensive system of inland waterways, and large mineral deposits.

In reserves of iron ore (42 billion metric tons), beryllium, niobium and crystalline quartz, Brazil ranks first among the countries of the capitalist world; and third or fourth in reserves of manganese, tantalum and apatite. Brazil is rich also in nonferrous metals and belongs among the few countries in the world that have significant deposits of nuclear raw materials: uranium and thorium ores. There are also deposits of petroleum and coal, but the country's fuel supply presents a serious problem, and 80 percent of the petroleum requirement has to be imported. Lately, the harnessing of hydroelectric power has been proceeding vigorously.

Most of the country's population and basic economic activity are concentrated in a narrow strip along the Atlantic coast. The inland regions are sparsely populated and not very developed. The country's economic activity and political life are mainly in the southeast and south where the main economic centers are located, the cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

Sao Paulo is one of the fastest growing cities in the world (Greater Sao Paulo has a population of over 12 million). It is the "industrial heart" of Brazil. The other center, Rio de Janeiro, is Brazil's "gateway." It has a large port for imports and is a financial and business center. The Cariocas, the residents of Rio that was the country's capital for nearly 200 years (until 1960), are very proud of their beautiful city. Rio's attractions include Copacabana ("the best beach in the New World"), picturesque Guanabara Bay, Corcovado (Hunchback) Peak in the geometric center of the city with a 38-meter statue of Christ on its top, and a multitude of antique buildings and historical monuments. But here, just as in many other large cities, there are the invariable "satellites" of the luxurious detached homes and hotels, the slums with their thousands of miserable tin and plywood shanties that cling to the slopes like bird's nests.

Brasilia, the country's new capital, was built in the 1950's merely in a matter of a few years, on a barren plateau in the geographic center of the country. The boldness and functional beauty of its architecture are striking. Viewed from the observation platform of the television tower, one of the highest in the world, the city's outlines resemble an airplane. The architect L. Costa had proposed such a layout. In the "fuselage" are open spaces with public buildings: the complex of National Congress buildings, the Government Palace, the Palace of the Dawn (presidential palace), etc. These architectural groups of modern form, attracting stream of tourists from the entire world, were designed by Oscar Niemeyer, one of the most famous modern architects and a laureate of the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among Nations." In the "wings" with a span of 12 km are the residential districts where the buildings are supported by 10-meter pillars, to provide space for motor vehicles under them.

The city's planners believed that Brasilia would be basically a "city of institutions" with a population of not more than 500,000. In the late 1970's, however, its population was already over 760,000.

Ethnically the typical Brazilian is a mixture of many races and nationalities: of the native Indian population, Portuguese conquerors; Negro slaves imported in colonial times, and of the many immigrants from the countries of Europe and Asia. The official language of Brazil is Portuguese. The population is 93 percent Catholic.

Constitutionally Brazil is a federal republic comprising 23 states, 3 federal territories and 1 federal (capital) district. The present political system in Brazil was established as a result of a military coup in April of 1964; it occurred under the conditions of an economic decline, intensification of social and class contradictions, and an upsurge of the struggle by workers and bourgeois national forces for structural reforms. After the coup, a military government assumed power, representing the interests of big capital and of the monopolies.

To replace the abolished bourgeois democratic constitution of 1946, the National Congress adopted a new constitutional law in 1967. According to the 1967 constitution (as modified and amended in the following years), the president is elected to a six-year term by an electoral college (consisting of the members of Congress and delegates of the state assemblies), on the recommendation of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. He is the head of state and head of government, with broad powers. He is authorized to issue decrees that have the force of law. The legislative powers of the National Congress, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, are limited accordingly. Its main functions are to approve the federal budget, and to record and adopt the legislative bills presented by the executive branch. Wide authority has been vested in the National Security Council, consisting of the president, vice president, the ministers, and representatives of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The states have their own constitutions, assemblies, and governors, and the federal territories are administered by prefects. Their autonomous rights are sharply curtailed, because the president is empowered to intervene in their affairs.

The constitution of 1967 confirms the superiority of the executive branch in relation to the legislative branch, and the bourgeois freedoms that it provides are limited by extraordinary measures, so-called "institutional acts," and by other decrees with the force of law that the military authorities issue. For example, the law decree "on national security" that President Castelo Branco issued in March of 1967 made it a crime to undertake any action "that directly or indirectly obstructs national objectives"; it banned Communist propaganda, agitation and "infiltration"; and it provided stiff sentences (up to 30 years of imprisonment) for so-called "subversive activity."

After 1964, four military governments followed in succession: Castelo Branco (1964-1967), Costa e Silva (1967-1969), G. Medici (1969-1974) and E. Geisel (1974-1979). In March of 1979, General J. B. Figueiredo became president for the next six-year term. Throughout all these years in Brazil, continuity was maintained on the basic questions of domestic and foreign policy, because in their activities the military governments followed the long-term strategic guidelines of the "doctrine of national security" that was worked out by ideologues from the Military College. This doctrine declared Brazil an inseparable part of "Western Christian civilization." It called for the maintenance of "political stability," modernization of the capitalist economy with high rates of economic growth, and the growth of military potential, in order to convert Brazil into a world power by the year 2000.

The doctrine of "national security" became the basis of the so-called "Brazilian model of development." Three stages can be distinguished in its evolution: formation--the second half of the 1960's; intensification of contradictions--the first half of the 1970's; and crisis--after 1975. Brazil's altered economic situation, the intensification of class struggle within the country and the changes in the international arena are compelling the military regime to introduce essential corrections and to review many aspects of government policy.

Contradictions of Economic Development

In the sphere of the economy the military regime adopted a policy of boosting the rates of economic growth in every possible way, and of modernizing Brazilian

capitalism, by sharply increasing the exploitation of labor and by cooperating closely with the international monopolies.

An important element of the "Brazilian model of development" was an "open door" policy toward the international monopolies. According to the official propaganda, the government measures to stimulate foreign investment embody a "flexible policy" toward the powerful multinational corporations and serve to "tame" them. In fact the multinational corporations have converted Brazil into a paradise for foreign capital. Since World War II, perhaps no developing country has experienced such an invasion by international monopolies, which play an important role in the imperialist strategy of neocolonialism.

Direct foreign investment in the Brazilian economy increased from 1.4 billion dollars in 1969 to 17.5 billion in 1980. United States corporations are in the lead (with 4.6 billion dollars), although their West German and Japanese competitors (with 2.6 and 1.7 billion dollars, respectively) have slightly narrowed this lead in recent years.

International financial organizations and private banks invested even more, in the form of loans and credits, which rapidly increased Brazil's foreign indebtedness.¹ Initially, however, the Brazilian capitalist economy received a strong stimulus through external financing. The net influx of foreign capital in 1970-1977 totaled 22 billion dollars.

The reasons for this "generosity" of the imperialists were not accidental. The declaration issued by the Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, held in Havana in 1975, pointed out that "Brazil is unquestionably the most typical example of the new methods that the imperialists are using for penetration and dominance."² By carrying out operations to modernize Brazilian capitalism and by supporting the military regime, United States monopoly capital expects to increase the importance of the "Brazilian model of development" in the eyes of the Latin American nations, to contrast it with the results of socialist Cuba, and to strengthen its position in the region.

The Brazilian bourgeoisie found another source of financing economic development in reducing the living standards of the workers and of the urban and rural middle strata. After 1964, state control of the wages of blue-collar workers and employees became an important element of the policy to concentrate incomes in accordance with the interests of big capital. The essence of this control is that reviews of the minimum wage level in conjunction with inflation are held so that raises lag behind the rise in the cost of living. As a result, real wages have dropped considerably. In addition, the military authorities introduced a tax reform that gives the rich substantial tax relief and increased direct taxes, which are reflected primarily in the living conditions of the working population. Thanks to this, the Brazilian bourgeoisie has been given an opportunity to sharply increase its exploitation of labor, to expand production and increase the profitability of its enterprises, by making their products more competitive on the world market.

The state sector—it had developed considerably in first postwar decades, to a large extent under the influence of the people's struggle to increase the country's economic independence and to recover the natural resources seized by the foreign monopolies—was made to serve the interests of the local upper

bourgeoisie and of the foreign monopolies. The state's role in the socioeconomic development of Brazil is determined by the fact that it has control over more than 500 enterprises employing about 1.0 million persons. The state sector's share in domestic accumulation is as high as 60 percent. The state-owned companies Petrobras (production and refining of petroleum, petrochemicals), Siderobras (steelmaking), Electrobras (power generation and distribution), Nuclebras (nuclear power) and others rank first in Brazil in terms of capital and production. Some of them--for example, Petrobras--are included in the list of the capitalist world's largest monopolies.

In the second half of the 1960's, military technocrats entered the managements of most state enterprises. The functions of the state sector concentrated increasingly on developing the war industry, the branches of the economy with a low profitability (which Brazilian private capital could not afford to operate), and on supplying local and foreign entrepreneurs with electric power, fuel, raw materials and transportation services. As a result, the nature of the state sector changed. From an instrument for strengthening Brazil's economic independence, it began to change into an important instrument of state monopoly capitalism in Brazil.

Development of the sparsely populated inland regions provided an additional stimulus to economic development. New roads were built--the Transamazon Highway (5,5400 km long), the Northern Highway (4000 km), and others--that linked the inland regions with the main centers of economic activity along the Atlantic coast. In the Serranôas Carejas in Amazonia, development began of the rich deposits of iron ore, bauxite, copper, manganese, gold, nickel and lead, by a state-owned company established for this purpose, Amazonia Minerabau, in cooperation with Brazilian and foreign private firms. According to the managers of the Gran Carejas project, which bourgeois propaganda has called "the project of the century," the capital investment (over 35 billion dollars) will make the country by 1990 one of the leading exporters of mineral raw materials in the capitalist world.

We should likewise note that, from the second half of the 1960's, conditions on the international market were favorable for Brazil's traditional exports (coffee, sugar, iron ore), which increased the foreign-exchange earnings needed to import equipment and new technology. All this generated an economic boom that lasted 7 years, from 1968 through 1974.

The average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GNP) during this period was over 10 percent. In terms of total volume, Brazil's GNP ranked fifth among the capitalist countries of the world. Construction began of large industrial enterprises equipped with modern technology. On the Parana River construction began of the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant, one of the largest in the world, with an installed generating capacity of 12.6 million kilowatts. A contract was signed with the Westinghouse Corporation of the United States for the construction of the Angra 1 nuclear power plant in Rio de Janeiro State, the first nuclear power plant in Brazil (it was commissioned in 1982). In San Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo State, an aerospace engineering center was established and work was begun on a Brazilian space satellite and its rocket, scheduled for launching in the second half of the 1980's. On the basis of individual indicators, Brazil began to appear in the list of the capitalist world's largest

producers. It rose to second place, after Japan, in shipbuilding (in 1980, 126 ships totaling 1.2 million tons displacement), to seventh place in steel production (15 million tons in 1980) and in the production of motor vehicles (1,165,000 units of all types in 1980).

The military-industrial complex has developed considerably. In the late 1970's, Brazil's military expenditures totaled 2.088 billion dollars, with the armed forces 280,000 strong, and 200,000 in the military police.

Agricultural output likewise increased, primarily in the branches of agriculture oriented toward the foreign market. During the past decade Brazil advanced among the world's largest producers of cane sugar and soybeans, and in the capitalist world it ranked second, after the United States, in agricultural export.

The successes in the area of the economy served as the basis for creating the propaganda myth about Brazil's "economic miracle," which the bourgeois press earnestly spread.

It should be noted first of all that the relatively high rates of economic growth in Brazil in the late 1960's and in the first half of the 1970's are not "supernatural" at all. V. I. Lenin's law concerning uneven and spasmodic economic and political development in the era of imperialism is generally valid. It manifests itself not only in the group of highly developed capitalist countries (where, as we know, Japan now ranks second after the United States), although two decades ago it was the last in this group) but also among the developing countries. Some of them have made a significant jump in their economic development, thanks to the development of their natural resources, to their most brutal exploitation of labor or to other factors. Soviet researchers tend increasingly to include Brazil among the intermediately developed capitalist countries that, in terms of the rates and level of their development, are far ahead of the developing countries and in many of their indicators already exceed the countries that are at the bottom of the list of developed capitalist countries.³ However, this justifiably raises the following questions: Does this serve to strengthen the country's economic independence? Who enjoys the fruits of such development? And what price must the workers pay for it?

Progressive scientists of Brazil and of other countries have pointed out that behind the facade of the "Brazilian miracle" there lie concealed the sharp contradictions of dependent capitalist development.⁴ The "Brazilian model of development" has enabled foreign imperialists to strengthen their position in that country. In the mid-1970's, multinational corporations controlled 40 percent of Brazil's money market, 62 percent of its foreign trade, 77 percent of its air shipments, and 82 percent of its ocean shipments. The leading, most dynamic branches of industry are in their hands. The tribute that Brazil pays the multinational corporations and its foreign creditors each year exceeded 10 billion dollars in the late 1970's.

However, the degree of local capital's dependence on multinational corporations should not be overestimated either. The big Brazilian entrepreneurs and financiers also reaped huge profits from the "economic miracle." The formation and rapid enrichment of local monopolistic groups and associations are proceeding intensively. In the footsteps of the developed capitalist countries' giant

corporations, they are striving to expand beyond Brazil's borders, especially into the neighboring countries of South America and even into Africa.

The concentration of wealth in the hands of the cream of the exploiting classes is accompanied by the growing impoverishment of the workers. In 1960, 5 percent of Brazil's population (the very rich) accounted for 27 percent of national income, but in 1976 their share was already 39 percent. The share of one-half of the population with the lowest incomes dropped during the same period from 17.7 to 11.8 percent. Thus the "economic miracle" has wrought new burdens and suffering for the workers. Jose Forta, the correspondent of the French newspaper "L'HUMANITE" who in early 1979 travelled more than 10,000 kilometers throughout Brazil, reported: "Millions of Brazilians are going hungry, and nobody is disturbed by their lot." In his reports he cites an interview with a priest in the northeastern part of the country. One-third of Brazil's population is living in that region. It has an unemployment rate of 11 percent, and the proportion of the semiunemployed is 27 percent. Over 40 percent of the population are illiterate. In Recife, the capital of this region, about 300,000 men, women and children are forced to seek temporary shelter each night. The priest said: "The Brazilian miracle is that they are able to survive under these conditions."⁵

The intensification of social inequality and the wide-scale reproduction of the poverty of wide population masses are the main, but not the only, flaw of the "Brazilian model of development." The economic boom has been confined mostly to a small part of the country's territory, along the Atlantic coast. The "centered" nature of capitalist modernization, and the lag of farm production to supply only domestic needs intensified the disproportions within the economy. With each the heavy burden of servicing foreign debts and transferring the profits of the multinational corporations increased.

All these contradictions peculiar to the "Brazilian model of development" paved the way for the collapse of the "economic miracle." It became evident when in 1974-1975 the capitalist world fell into its deepest crisis in recent years.

The decline in the Brazilian economy began in 1974 and assumed a protracted nature. The rates of economic growth slowed down. So-called "manageable inflation" became uncontrollable. The cruzeiro's depreciation accelerated, and the problems of the domestic market intensified. The financial situation worsened as a result of deficits in the balance of trade and balance of payments. Forced agricultural export led to food shortages within the country. In 1978-1981, Brazil was forced to import wheat, corn, rice and meat.

The economic shocks and the foreign-exchange and financial difficulties compelled the E. Geisel and J. B. Figueiredo governments to adopt a number of emergency measures. One of them was the policy of the economy's "liberalization," which in practice means new concessions and advantages for private capital, both domestic and foreign. The government permitted foreign monopolies to undertake petroleum exploration in promising zones, mainly along Brazil's Atlantic shelf. In 1979, the authorities put up for sale large tracts of tropical forests in Amazonia. Brazilian magnates, and United States, West German and Italian companies acquired about 2.0 million hectares. In 1981, the transfer of about 100 enterprises of the state sector to Brazilian private companies began. New large foreign loans were obtained, which Brazil will have to repay in the 1980's.

More than 5 years have elapsed since the sharp decline in the middle of the 1970's, but the pulse of the Brazilian economy remains feverish. The balance-of-trade deficit has become chronic, aggravating the foreign-exchange and financial situation. During these five years, inflation has increased. In 1981, prices rose by 100 percent. Mass unemployment increased. All these facts indicate that the "Brazilian model of development" has failed to solve the radical socioeconomic problems of the country and has merely intensified them.

Workers' Situation, Struggle

Significant shifts have occurred in recent years in the social structure of Brazilian society. The number and proportion of workers have increased in the cities and rural areas. If in 1950 the army of hired labor accounted for 50.6 percent of the gainfully employed population, by 1978 its proportion was already 62.6 percent. During the same period the gainfully employed population increased 2.5-fold, from 17.1 to 45.3 million persons.

The industrial working class is growing at the fastest rate, and the number of industrial workers has exceeded 6.0 million. At the same time, significant changes are taking place in the structure of the working class by trades. In the mid-1970's, about 40 percent of all industrial workers were employed in the metallurgical, engineering, chemical and electrical engineering industries, whereas in 1950 these industries employed only 20 percent of all workers. Large enterprises, such as Volkswagen do Brasil (25,000 employees) and Ford Motors do Brasil (18,000 employees), were formed primarily in these basic industries. The concentration of the working class at large enterprises in the main industrial centers increased: 85 percent of the working class lives in the southeast, in the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo. The employment of hired labor is spreading also in agriculture: according to the 1975 census, there were 1.2 million permanent and 6.8 million seasonal workers.

All this permits the conclusion that the absolute and relative growth of the combined total working class represents the main trend of the shifts in the social structure of Brazil. In the country there has emerged a new working class, one with clearer class awareness and no illusions regarding capitalism, ready to wage organized struggle for its interests against the local and foreign monopolies. However, it is necessary to take into account that capitalism in Brazil is developing intensively not only in depth (the process of concentrating production and capital) but also in breadth (the inclusion of the economically backward regions in the system of capitalist relations, and the formation each year of tens and thousands of small and medium enterprises). As before, moreover, a significant proportion of the work force is employed in cottage industries, small trade, personal services, etc.

As the working class grows in size, it is thus becoming more inhomogeneous, and wider become the differences between detachments of the working class in terms of working conditions, skills, education, and social and financial situation. This underscores the importance of the task of ensuring the action unity and solidarity of all workers. The more so because the officially authorized trade unions are under the control of the Ministry of Labor. At enterprises and institutions there are so-called "vertical trade unions" that unite blue-collar workers, employees and other hired persons, by trades. The trade unions jointly form, by

branches, eight national confederations, the most important of which are the confederations of industrial workers, farm workers, state employees, and surface transport workers. The trade unions in Brazil have a membership of 6.4 million, which is only 15 percent of the total number of persons gainfully employed.

The true spokesman for the expectations and aspirations of the working class is the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). Since its formation in 1922, persecutions have forced the PCB to operate almost always underground or as a semilegal party. In spite of this, the Brazilian Communists are participating in all actions of the workers. The Communists have made a significant contribution to the development of the liberation movement in the country, raising such popular slogans as "Economic Independence," "Agrarian Reform," "Brazilian Petroleum for the Brazilians," etc. They are combining the struggle for freedom and democracy with the protection of the vital interests of all workers, and with actions against the dominance of the local and foreign monopolies. Characterizing the strategy of the PCB, the PCB Central Committee's general secretary, Giocondo Dias, wrote the following in an article entitled "Communist Objectives": "We are convinced that the only viable alternative for Brazil is the path of democratic changes, and the forms in which these changes are made will be determined by the real balance of political forces in the course of the full intensity of class struggle."⁶ In the opinion of the Communists, such prospects of the country's development must be ensured by a broad national coalition of all population strata interested in social progress, democracy and the independence of Brazil.

For the vast majority of the army of hired labor, the "economic miracle" has turned into superexploitation. Galloping inflation and the continuous rise of prices are reducing real incomes. After 1964, for example, the real wages of workers in Sao Paulo, the main industrial center of Brazil, fluctuated in the period 1965-1978 between 65 and 90 percent of the 1952 level. Unemployment has become a terrible scourge of the workers: 9.0 million workers, nearly 20 percent of the entire population of work age, have no permanent work.

In the late 1970's, the dissatisfaction of wide population strata with their deteriorating living conditions and with the absence of democratic rights and freedoms in the country led to mass demonstrations by the working class, students, the urban middle strata and the intelligentsia .

In May of 1978, there occurred in Sao Paulo State the largest strike by workers in 15 years. The workers of enterprises in the automotive, aluminum, chemical, electrical engineering, textile and other industries took part in it. The strikers' demands for higher pay were met. This victory gave the working class confidence in its strength, and it helped to strengthen the political awareness and solidarity of the workers.

The plenum of the PCB Central Committee, in May of 1979, noted that a qualitatively new situation was developing in the country, characterized by an upsurge of the working-class and democratic movements.⁷ Merely in a 12-month period (from May 1978 to May 1979), 1.3 million workers and employees went on strike, in spite of the fact that strikes were banned.

Large-scale strikes by workers continued. There were accompanying demonstrations by students and intellectuals, and extensive campaigns for political amnesty, for freedom of the press and freedom of speech, for the abolition of repressive laws,

and for convening a constitutional assembly to draft a new democratic constitution. In April of 1980, 140,000 metallurgical workers in Sao Paulo stopped work, demanding another wage increase due to inflation, and shorter working hours. This strike continued until July 1980 and developed into a confrontation with the authorities. The regional labor tribunal declared the strike illegal. The military tribunal of Sao Paulo State sentenced the arrested trade-union leaders, headed by Luis Ignacio da Silva (Lulu) to prison terms of 2 to 3.5 years.

However, this did not stop the wave of actions. In September and December of 1980, the students of universities and higher educational institutions in several states declared strikes. In August of 1981, worker demonstrations broke out in Salvador, the principal city in the northeast, and in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas State, in protest of mass layoffs and the rising cost of living.

The class contradictions intensified in the villages. The situation there was characterized by sharp polarization based on ownership. Most of the land in the country is concentrated in the hand of the owners of large estates, while 10 million persons among the rural population of work age have no land and are forced to rent small plots on one-sided terms, or to work for a pittance on the large estates or for the foreign companies that have acquired huge holdings in various regions of the country. The 40,000 large farms (over 1000 hectares each), less than 1 percent of the total number, account for 43 percent of the total acreage of farmland privately owned (according to the 1975 census). The opposite pole is formed by the 2.6 million small farms of less than 10 hectares each (52 percent of the total number of farms). Their share of the total acreage is merely 2.8 percent. Millions of peasants are hungering for land, but more than 95 percent of the land belonging to the large estates is not being cultivated.

Protest against the yoke of the large estates is spreading. Arbitrary seizures of unused land by peasants and farm workers lead to numerous conflicts with the large landowners and state authorities. There are about 500,000 peasants in the category of "occupantes" or squatters who are farming on fallow land without any title to it. Under the slogans "Land to Those Who Work It" and "For a General Land Reform," about 1.5 million peasants participated in the 1980 drive for agrarian reform. More than 3.0 million rural workers have joined trade unions, associations and production cooperatives to resist more successfully the pressure of the large estates and multinational corporations.

The workers' struggle became an important factor in the change of the political situation in Brazil and influenced considerably the course of government policy.

Rising Democratic Opposition, Evolution of the Military Regime

The domestic political situation in Brazil in the second half of the 1970's was characterized also by a growing mood of opposition among the nonproletarian strata of the population, parallel with the activization of the working-class movement.

The political differentiation within the bloc of ruling forces is reflected in the growing criticism of the government's economic and domestic policies by various circles of Brazil's bourgeoisie.

The so-called "nonmonopolized bourgeoisie," i.e., the hundreds and thousands of small and medium entrepreneurs who obtained only crumbs from economic growth,

are seeking expansion of the domestic market, a redistribution of national income, changes in credit terms, and curbs on the activity of the multinational corporations. They are in favor of a return to bourgeois democracy and to a civilian government. Certain groups of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie have likewise changed their standpoint, in favor of restoring the representative forms of government. In their opinion, "a return of the army to the barracks" should relieve the political tension in the country and end excessive government control of the economy. They refer to Ecuador, Peru and Panama as examples, where civilian government has been restored after a long period of military rule.

More and more representatives of the intermediate strata are going over to the opposition's camp, and this is reflected in the activity of many influential organizations such as the Order of Attorneys, and the Press Association.

A change in the standpoint of the Catholic Church and a reassessment of its values have helped the political barometer's swing to the left. The church hierarchy comprises 6 cardinals, over 300 bishops and 14,000 priests. The Catholic Church controls a network of parish schools, hundreds of hospitals asylums and orphanages, radio stations, and tens of newspapers and publishing houses. The National Conference of Bishops, formed to coordinate the activity of the Catholic hierarchy, has considerable influence in the country and abroad.

Even though the Catholic Church is not homogeneous and there are three conflicting currents within it (radical, liberal, and conservative), on the whole it tends toward a constructive dialogue with non-Catholics, including the Communists. Pointing out the need to correctly evaluate the new phenomena within Brazilian Catholicism, the PCB in a policy resolution of its Central Committee emphasized that "authoritative church circles and the movements under the church's influence play a prominent role in the struggle for popular demands and for the rights of the urban and rural workers."⁸

Intensification of the domestic political contradictions has spread to the armed forces, the mainstay of the ruling regime. Although the government maintains control of the armed forces, among the military there have formed opposition groups, mostly of a nationalist nature, that the Brazilian press has named "the movement of the colonels." Their views regarding political changes in Brazil agree in many respects with the program of the opposition's civilian statesmen. Thus a demarcation was proposed within the armed forces, where previously the influence of an ultraright group was the dominant. The dissent among senior officers manifested itself openly in conjunction with the selection of a candidate for president in 1978, and with the retirement of some of the military district commanders.

The new balance of political forces in the country was reflected in the results of the 1978 elections. Despite all the obstacles raised after 1964 to a two-party system--only the ruling party, the National Alliance of Renewal (ARENA), and the legal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), were allowed to function--wide masses of the electorate voted for political changes. They supported the minimum program of the MDB that included demands for a general amnesty, the restoration of political and trade-union rights, liquidation of the apparatus of repression, and the convening of a National Constitutional Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. The elections of 1978 demonstrated that the social base of ARENA was narrowing. In the country there emerged a broad informal coalition of oppositionary forces that included various classes and social strata. Although each participant in this coalition had his own objectives,

all participants were united by a common desire for democratization, paving the way for the country's political, economic and social renewal.

On the whole the growing movement of wide working masses and democratic forces induced the ruling military regime to switch to a policy of "liberalization" that called for restoring limited bourgeois democracy in Brazil, gradually, in stages. This policy began in the end of 1978 when the National Congress approved President Geisel's proposals for partial "liberalization." The force of Institutional Act No 5, issued 10 years earlier, was terminated as of 1 January 1979, and civil rights were restored with some restrictions on many political rights. Press censorship also was abolished.

The Figueiredo government took further steps in this direction. In September of 1979 it promulgated a law granting amnesty to political prisoners and persons deprived of their political rights. This enabled many progressive statesmen and bourgeois democrats to return home and enter into politics. A law was adopted restoring the direct election of state governors. The elections were scheduled for November 1982, when also a new National Congress, municipal organs and city mayors were to be elected. The government announced that a civilian would be elected president in the presidential elections of 1985.

As Giocondo Dias, the general secretary of the PCB, noted in his salutatory address at the 26th CPSU Congress, "liberalization" has become the dominant trend in Brazil's present political process.¹⁰ The working class, working strata and progressive circles have won significant democratic gains that offer favorable prospects for the further struggle in behalf of social progress and democracy.

However, the specifics of this process of "liberalization" are that it is being realized "from above," is of a limited nature and a part of a maneuver by the military-technocratic circles to strengthen the capitalist structures and to retain for the army, after its return to the barracks, the function of an "invisible guarantor" of political "stability."

A reform of political parties, announced at the end of 1979, was calculated to divide the forces of the opposition. ARENA and MDB were dissolved and the creation of a multiparty system was begun, involving complicated procedures for the formation and registration of political parties.

Supporters of the military regime formed the Democratic Social Party. This ruling party of the upper bourgeoisie, large landowners and of the military-technocratic bureaucracy has a majority of seats in the National Congress. Its slogan is "Reconstruction and Peaceful Reforms." President Figueiredo, ministers of the three military services, and other politicians of the military regime became its members.

The largest opposition party is the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), distinguished by its mixed composition. Its supporters include, together with oligarchic groups, also circles of the middle and small bourgeoisie, and a proportion of the intelligentsia. The program of the PMDB calls for an end to authoritarian rule, a land reform, and a number of other bourgeois reforms. The program of the People's Party, which has ties to the bourgeoisie in the industrially developed states, is similar to that of the PMDB. At the beginning of 1982, the two parties merged.

More radical are the standpoints of the two trabahtistic¹¹ parties that present themselves as continuations of the "historical missions" of two former

presidents, G. Vargas in the 1930's and J. Goulart in the early 1960's, prominent statesmen of the nationalistic bourgeoisie in the pre-1964 period. Both parties are oriented toward the intermediate urban and rural strata and traditionally enjoy the support of a proportion of the workers. Their activity is being encouraged by the social democratic leaders of Western Europe. The formation of these two parties is due to the existence of two currents within traditionalism, one radical the other moderate. The radical wing is represented by the Democratic Labor Party of Leonel Brizola. Under the slogan of "Democratic Socialism," it advocates the nationalization of banks and of the basic branches of industry. The moderate wing is the Brazilian Labor Party headed by Yveta Vargas (the niece of G. Vargas). It is trying to establish contact with the main bourgeois opposition parties.

A new phenomenon in the political life of present-day Brazil is the Workers' Party, founded by the younger generation of Sao Paulo trade-union leaders who organized the recent large-scale strikes there. The party is headed by L. I. da Silva. The party's program has won the support of many workers. It advocates the need to introduce radical changes, and "to build a society of equals, without exploiters and exploited."

The establishment of a multiparty system has been accompanied by the growing political activity of the population and by stormy debates on the ways to change Brazil's social system and to solve the problems of socioeconomic development that are ripe for solution. The Brazilian Communists are participating extensively in these processes. For the first time after many years of persecution, they are living and working under conditions of relative legality. Since the end of 1979, the Communist newspaper VOZ DA UNIDADE is being published openly. The first legally functioning PCB committee was formed in the worker district of Sao Paulo in 1981. The plenum of the PCB Central Committee, held in May of 1980, adopted a resolution to convene the next, seventh, party congress to draft a program for the activity of the Communists under the new conditions. So far as the present transitional period is concerned, the Communists consider it vitally important to form a unified front of all forces opposed to dictatorship. Giocondo Dias wrote: "The Communists see their main task in constantly striving for the cooperation of all democrats, in fighting jointly with the other progressive forces for the strengthening and expansion of the freedoms won, for the real democratization of Brazilian society."¹² All honest people in Brazil are supporting the Communists' demand for the legalization of the PCB.

At the same time the ultraright forces have become noticeably more active, especially more recently. The generals who represent the so-called "hard line" within the armed forces have demanded that the "struggle against communism" be stepped up. In August of 1981, General Golbery, an advocate of "liberalization" who occupied the influential post of chief of the Civilian Household of the Presidency, was forced into retirement. Acts of terrorism--bomb explosions in the offices of worker and other progressive organizations--began in many large cities of Brazil. This was the work of militarized right-wing extremist organization such as the "Death Squad," "Cambio 16," "CCC" (Command for Hunting Communists) and others. Protesting against these acts of terrorism, the general public regards this campaign of terror as an attempt by the ultraright forces to return the country to the gloomy period of military dictatorship.

The popular masses will have to fight difficult battles with the reaction that refuses to depart from the political scene voluntarily.

New Trends in Foreign Policy

Changes in Brazil's foreign policy began earlier than the "liberalization" of domestic policy. They were dictated by an "economic imperative": a great need to gain new foreign markets and to expand the circle of trading partners, and to take into account the positive changes in the world associated with detente. They reflected the efforts of the ruling circles to increase the country's potential in the international arena by shifting to an independent course in foreign policy, aiming for cooperation with all countries of the world.

When General E. Geisel assumed the presidency in 1974, the government announced that in world affairs it would adhere to the doctrine of "responsible pragmatism and nonautomatic alliances." During the preceding decade, Brazil played the role of a "privileged ally of the United States." This role involved such actions as breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba, participation in the armed intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic, support of the White House's Vietnam adventure and of the colonial war by Salazar's Portugal in Africa, and the "freezing" of relations with the socialist countries. Practical implementation of Geisel's doctrine manifested itself primarily in "maintaining a certain distance" between Brazil's foreign policy and the policies of Washington.

A contributing factor in this was also the discrimination against Brazilian goods on the United States market. In the early 1970's, the United States introduced a series of measures that made it more difficult to export Brazilian goods to that country (shoes, textiles, instant coffee, etc.). This was the spark that "ignited" the combustible material that had accumulated over a longer period of time. Further events proved that the intensification of contradictions between the two countries was due to objective factors. Brazil's economic potential increased. The institutionalization of the military regime strengthened its position, and its possibilities of maneuvering in the international arena became greater, thanks to the expansion of Brazil's foreign relations.

The Brazilian government announced specifically under these conditions its refusal to "automatically" follow the foreign policies of the United States, and it began to push for the confirmation of equality in American-Brazilian relations, which was received with disfavor in Washington.

The political discord between the two countries came into the open when the Carter Administration attempted to pressure Brazil in 1975 not to conclude with the FRG the nuclear "deal of the century," which undermined the monopoly of the United States in supplying nuclear equipment and fuel to its southern neighbors. As a sign of its protest, the Brazilian government in 1977 terminated a series of military cooperation agreements that had been concluded with the United States earlier, and then in 1978 it refused 50 million dollars of military aid from Washington.

Attempts to smooth American-Brazilian differences during the summit talks that were held during visits to Brazil by President J. Carter (in 1978) and Vice Presidents W. Mondale (1979) and G. Bush (1981) and during President J. B. Figueiredo's visit to the United States (in 1982), did not produce the expected results. On many international issues in the early 1980's, including the

conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Central America or the war over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the standpoints of the Brazilian government differed considerably from those of the Reagan Administration, which was pursuing a policy of increasing international tension.

When evaluating the American-Brazilian contradictions, one must take into account that the long-term class interests of the ruling circles in the United States and in Brazil are identical. But as many facts indicate, relations between the countries are nonetheless becoming more complex, and Washington is reacting very painfully to the new trends in Brazil's foreign policy.

Having rejected alignment with Washington, the Brazilian government ensured for itself considerable freedom of action within the framework of "traditional" relations with the West and began to attribute primary importance to expanding the country's international relations. In recent years the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened scores of legations, mainly in developing countries, and concluded trade agreements and agreements of economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation with more than 50 countries.

The standpoints of Brazil on the main problems of world politics--such as disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism and racism, and the establishment of a new international economic order--shifted closer to the policies of the basic group of developing countries. Today Brazilian diplomacy often claims to be the spokesman for their demands in the United Nations and before other international forums. A Brazilian delegation came to Havana as observers to attend the 6th Conference of the Heads of States and Heads of Governments of the Non-aligned Countries.

Exploitation of the contradictions and disputes among the three principal centers of present-day imperialism--the United States, the European Economic Community and Japan--has assumed an important place in the military regime's foreign-policy strategy.

Among the countries of Western Europe, the most importance is being attached to the development of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, which has huge economic interests in Brazil. In 1975, the Brazilian government concluded with the FRG a nuclear agreement that came to be known as the "deal of the century." This agreement, planned for a period of 15 years, calls for the construction of nuclear power plants and the establishment of a closed cycle of nuclear power generation, beginning with the mining of uranium to obtaining plutonium which, as we very well know, is the starting material for nuclear weapons. During President J. B. Figueiredo's visit to the FRG in May of 1981, a specific understanding was reached concerning the further realization of this agreement. To strengthen mutual relations, contacts at the highest level were established also with the United Kingdom and France. In September of 1980, Brazil concluded a five-year economic and scientific-technical cooperation agreement with the European Economic Community. All these measures reduced the Brazilian economy's dependence on the United States market. The activation of Brazil's policy on the Latin American continent seeks to strengthen its economic position and influence in the region. Special attention is being devoted to the "Southern Cone," the region of traditional Argentine-Brazilian competition for leadership in Latin America. The agreement that the presidents of Brazil and Paraguay concluded in 1974, for the construction of

the Itaipo hydroelectric power plant on the Parana River, has been called by foreign observers a bridge opening the way for Brazilian capital to the west of the continent. Brazilian entrepreneurs are employing the same tactics also toward Bolivia, striving to participate in the joint development of the rich deposits of iron ore discovered in the border zone.

Brazilian diplomacy exerted considerable effort to conclude in 1978 the Amazon Pact under which Brazil and seven other South American countries are pooling their efforts to develop the Amazon Basin. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pursuing very persistently its policy of reconciling and bringing together the largest and most developed countries of the region. In 1979-1981, President Figueiredo made official visits to Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Columbia and Peru. In their turn the presidents of Peru, Argentina and Mexico visited Brazil. These state visits ended with the signing of agreements on trade and cooperation, covering various fields--from cultural exchange to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Latin American market's significance to Brazil has risen sharply. In 1980, Brazil exported to this market almost as much as to the United States market.

Attempting to strengthen its ties with the countries of Africa, Brazil in 1974 distanced itself from Portuguese colonialism, was one of the first countries to recognize Angola and other states that had cast off the Portuguese yoke, and supported in the United Nations the right to self-determination of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe. The agreements on economic aid and on Brazilian participation in the construction of industrial plants and other projects, which Brazil concluded in the 1970's with Algeria, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal, are helping to move Brazilian goods to African markets.

Brazil is seeking access to the petroleum wealth of the Arab countries. The state-owned Petrobras corporation is participating in petroleum exploration in Libya and Iraq. Brazilian diplomacy has agreed on cooperation with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Brazil has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legal representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO opened an office in Brazil in 1981.

Soviet-Brazilian Relations

Favorable shifts have occurred during the past decade in mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Brazil. Their significance exceeds the framework of bilateral relations, exerting an influence on the international situation. L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, noted: "Soviet-Brazilian relations today are relations of honest mutual cooperation, based on mutual respect for sovereignty and dignity, on equality and noninterference in each other's internal affairs."¹³ The road to this point has not been easy and smooth, but the important thing is that in the end the obstacles and difficulties have been overcome.¹⁴

The growing might and international prestige of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving nature of its foreign policy are appealing to wide circles in Brazil. Aside from the political factors, this can be attributed to the needs of the developing Brazilian economy, to Brazil's interest in the expansion of trade and economic relations.

Since the beginning of the 1970's there has been a stable trend of growing Soviet-Brazilian mutual trade, based on the intergovernmental trade and payments agreement concluded in 1963. Since 1975, it has been supplemented by an agreement on deliveries of Soviet machinery and equipment, and on purchases of Brazilian goods. This supplementing agreement will remain in force through 1982. The Soviet-Brazilian intergovernmental commission on trade, economic and scientific-technical cooperation meets regularly, alternating its sessions between the Soviet Union and Brazil.

The trade turnover between the Soviet Union and Brazil increased from 23 million rubles in 1970 to 275 million in 1980.¹⁵ Thanks to this, Brazil, together with Argentina, has become the Soviet Union's largest trading partner in Latin America (after Cuba). On the commodity list of Soviet-Brazilian trade there have appeared new items, in addition to such commodities as coffee, cacao, petroleum and petroleum products, vegetable oils and nonferrous metals that have traditionally occupied an important place in Soviet-Brazilian trade. Brazil has begun to purchase Soviet power-generating and other equipment, excavators, skidding tractors, watches and cement. In its turn the Soviet Union has begun to import substantial quantities of Brazilian manufactured goods, and also soybeans, sugar, hides and pharmaceutical products. However, the real possibilities of mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation between the two countries have not been exhausted by far. In conjunction with the fact that purchases by Brazil of Soviet goods are increasing more slowly than Soviet purchases in that country, the Brazilian press noted: "Today the Brazilian government is faced with a dilemma: to expand export to the Soviet Union, but at the same time to ensure an increase of import from that country."¹⁶

Closer ties between the two countries have been enhanced by the restoration in the 1970's of the cultural and scientific exchanges that were "frozen" after 1964. In the second half of the 1970's, the USSR Folk Dance Company, the ballet of the Bol'shoy Theater, and other collectives gave very successful guest performances in the cities of Brazil. Soviet audiences warmly welcomed the Brazilian Carcata Company, a folk dance group, and famous singers and musicians. Weeks of Soviet and Brazilian films are being held regularly. The works of writers, scientists, public figures and statesmen are being translated and published. In 1980, L. I. Brezhnev's trilogy "Malaya zemlya" (Small Earth), "Vozrozhdeniye" (Revival) and "Tselina" (Virgin Lands), translated into Portuguese and published by the Civilizasan Brasileira publishing house, met with wide response among the Brazilian public.

The possibilities of an active dialogue and political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Brazil, under the conditions of subsiding international tension, have been broadened. In the United Nations the Brazilian delegation supported many Soviet proposals on strengthening international peace and security, on banning new types of weapons of mass destruction, on excluding the use of force in international relations. It cosponsored a series of important resolutions (on signing the Convention on Banning the Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means Affecting the Environment, and others).

The common points of view and the narrowing of differences in the approaches of the Soviet Union and of Brazil manifested themselves on the questions of decolonization, condemnation of all forms of racial discrimination, and on the peaceful

settlement of the conflicts in the Middle East and South Africa. On a number of other international issues, however, the standpoints of the two countries essentially differ. These include particularly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, changes in the United Nations Charter, and the Antarctic.

Under these conditions it is especially important that both countries are showing a desire for mutual understanding and an interest in the expansion of their cooperation, on the principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.

In March 1979, at the inauguration of Brazil's President J. B. Figueiredo, the official Soviet delegation was headed by V. V. Kuznetsov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo and first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR. The delegation gave the president a message from L. I. Brezhnev. The Brazilian president sent L. I. Brezhnev a reply message in which he expressed his desire to strengthen relations between the two countries. Brazil, in the same way as many other countries in the world, rejected the Carter Administration's appeal to join in trade sanctions against the Soviet Union. Brazilian sportsmen participated in the 1980 Moscow Olympics. An important milestone in the improvement of mutual relations was the exchange of parliamentary delegations in 1980.

At the 26th CPSU Congress the growing role of the countries of Latin America in the world arena was noted, and among them the role of such countries as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru. L. I. Brezhnev said: "We note with satisfaction the expansion of the Soviet Union's mutually advantageous relations with the countries of Latin America, and we are willing to develop these relations further."¹⁷

This willingness of the Soviet Union materialized particularly in the new agreement on mutual deliveries of a number of Soviet and Brazilian goods in 1982-1986, concluded in July of 1981 when a Brazilian trade and economic delegation visited the Soviet Union. The Brazilian media noted the long-term nature of the agreement and characterized it as a qualitatively new stage in the two countries' mutual relations.

In September 1981, during the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations, a meeting was held by the two countries' foreign ministers, A. A. Gromyko and R. Saraiva Guerreiro, in the course of which such important matters were discussed as the preservation of peace and observation of the principle of noninterference. In June 1980, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet USSR paid an official visit to Brazil. It was headed by T. Ya. Kiselev, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo.

Under the present conditions, when the policies of the Reagan Administration and of some of the allies of the United States have caused an intensification of tension in the world arena, Soviet-Brazilian relations developing successfully on the principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, are one of the factors that are stabilizing the international situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. The country's foreign debt, according to official figures, increased from 2.8 billion dollars in 1964 to 65 billion dollars in 1981.

2. "Latinskaya Amerika v bor'be protiv imperializma za natsional'nuyu nezavisimost', demokratiyu, narodnoye blagosostoyaniye i sotsializm" (Latin America in the Struggle Against Imperialism, for National Independence, Democracy, National Prosperity and Socialism), Moscow, 1975, p 8.
3. Cf. Ye. M. Primakov, "The Law of Uneven Development and the Historical Destiny of the Liberated Countries," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 12, 1980.
4. Cf. N. Vernek Sodre, "Braziliya: analiz 'modeli razvitiya'" (Brazil: An Analysis of the 'Model of Development'), Moscow, 1976; J. E. Villegas, "Brazil as a Model for Developing Countries," New York, 1979.
5. L'HUMANITE, 22 and 23 Jan 79.
6. FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, 11 Apr 81.
7. "Resolucao politica do CC do Partido Comunista Brasileiro (maio de 1979)" (Political Resolution of the Brazilian Communist Party Central Committee, May 1979), Sao Paulo, 1979, pp 4-5.
8. "PCB: vinte anos de politica, 1958-1979. Documentacao" (The Brazilian Communist Party: Twenty Years of Policy, 1958-1979. Documentation), Sao Paulo, 1980, p 294.
9. Institutional Act No 5, issued by President Costa e Silva in December of 1968, gave the head of state exceptional powers to dissolve the Congress and the other legislative, and also judicial, organs, to revoke the mandates of the deputies of all elected institutions, and to intervene in the affairs of the states and municipalities.
10. PRAVDA, 4 Mar 81.
11. Trabalhism (from the Portuguese trabalho = labor) is a national reformist doctrine and system of actions aimed at ensuring "class cooperation" and the subordination of the workers to the political and economic interests of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. It was founded by G. Vargas.
12. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 11, 1981, p 35.
13. PRAVDA, 5 Jul 80.
14. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Brazil were established 2 April 1945, when both countries became members of the anti-Hitler coalition. In 1947, during the "cold war," diplomatic relations were broken off by Brazil and were restored in 1961.
15. "Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1980 godu" (The Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in 1980), Moscow, 1981, pp 258-259.
16. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 20 Apr 80.

17. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress],
Moscow, 1981, p25.

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